America is facing potentially the gravest constitutional crisis in
her history. Barack Obama must either stand up in a public forum and
prove, with conclusive documentary evidence, that he is “a natural
born Citizen” of the United States who has not renounced his
American citizenship—or he must step down as the Democratic Party’s
candidate for President of the United States—preferably before
the election is held, and in any event before the Electoral College
meets. Because, pursuant to the Constitution, only “a natural
born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States at the time of the
Adoption of th[e] Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of
President” (Article II, Section 1, Clause 4). And Obama clearly was
not “a Citizen of the United States at the time of the Adoption of
th[e] Constitution.”
Whether the evidence will show that Obama is, or is not, “a natural
born Citizen” who has never renounced his American citizenship is an
open question. The arguments on both sides are as yet speculative.
But Obama’s stubborn refusal to provide what he claims is “his own”
country with conclusive proof on that score compels the presumption
that he knows, or at least strongly suspects, that no sufficient
evidence in his favor exists. After all, he is not being pressed to
solve a problem in quantum physics that is “above his pay grade,”
but only asked to provide the public with the original copy of some
official record that establishes his citizenship. The vast majority
of Americans could easily do so. Why will Obama not dispel the
doubts about his eligibility—unless he can not?
Now that Obama’s citizenship has been seriously questioned, the
burden of proof rests squarely on his shoulders. The “burden of
establishing a delegation of power to the United States * * * is
upon those making the claim.” Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640, 653 (1948). And if each of the General Government’s powers must
be proven (not simply presumed) to exist, then every requirement
that the Constitution sets for any individual’s exercise of those
powers must also be proven (not simply presumed) to be fully
satisfied before that individual may exercise any of those
powers. The Constitution’s command that “[n]o Person except a
natural born Citizen * * * shall be eligible to the Office of
President” is an absolute prohibition against the exercise of each
and every Presidential power by certain unqualified individuals.
Actually (not simply presumptively or speculatively) being “a
natural born Citizen” is the condition precedent sine qua non
for avoiding this prohibition. Therefore, anyone who claims
eligibility for “the Office of President” must, when credibly
challenged, establish his qualifications in this regard with
sufficient evidence.
In disposing of the lawsuit Berg v. Obama, which squarely
presents the question of Obama’s true citizenship, the presiding
judge complained that Berg “would have us derail the democratic
process by invalidating a candidate for whom millions of people
voted and who underwent excessive vetting during what was one of the
most hotly contested presidential primary in living memory.” This is
exceptionally thin hogwash. A proper judicial inquiry into Obama’s
eligibility for “the Office of President” will not deny his
supporters a “right” to vote for him—rather, it will determine
whether they have any such “right” at all. For, just as Obama’s
“right” to stand for election to “the Office of President” is
contingent upon his being “a natural born Citizen,” so too are the
“rights” of his partisans to vote for him contingent upon whether he
is even eligible for that “Office.” If Obama is
ineligible, then no one can claim any “right” to vote for him.
Indeed, in that case every American who does vote has a
constitutional duty to vote against him.
The judge in Berg v. Obama dismissed the case, not because Obama has
actually proven that he is eligible for “the Office of President,”
but instead because, simply as a voter, Berg supposedly lacks
“standing” to challenge Obama’s eligibility:
regardless
of questions of causation, the grievance remains too generalized
to establish the existence of an injury in fact. * ** [A]
candidate’s ineligibility under the Natural Born Citizen Clause
does not result in an injury in fact to voters. By extension,
the theoretical constitutional harm experienced by voters does
not change as the candidacy of an allegedly ineligible candidate
progresses from the primaries to the general election.
This pronouncement does not rise to the level of hogwash.
First, the Constitution mandates that “[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution” (Article III, Section 2, Clause 1). Berg’s suit
plainly “aris[es] under th[e] Constitution,” in the sense of raising
a critical constitutional issue. So the only question is whether his
suit is a constitutional “Case[ ].” The present judicial test for
whether a litigant’s claim constitutes a constitutional “Case[ ]”
comes under the rubric of “standing”—a litigant with “standing” may
proceed; one without “standing” may not. “Standing,” however, is not
a term found anywhere in the Constitution. Neither are the specifics
of the doctrine of “standing,” as they have been elaborated in
judicial decision after judicial decision, to be found there.
Rather, the test for “standing” is almost entirely a judicial
invention.
True enough, the test for “standing” is not as ridiculous as the
judiciary’s so-called “compelling governmental interest test,” which
licenses public officials to abridge individuals’ constitutional
rights and thereby exercise powers the Constitution withholds from
those officials, which has no basis whatsoever in the Constitution,
and which is actually anti-constitutional. Neither is the
doctrine of “standing” as abusive as the “immunities” judges have
cut from whole cloth for public officials who violate their
constitutional “Oath[s] or Affirmation[s], to support this
Constitution” (Article VI, Clause 3)—in the face of the
Constitution’s explicit limitation on official immunities (Article
I, Section 6, Clause 1). For the Constitution does require that a
litigant must present a true “Case[ ].” Yet, because the test for
“standing” is largely a contrivance of all-too-fallible men and
women, its specifics can be changed as easily as they were adopted,
when they are found to be faulty. And they must be changed if
the consequences of judicial ignorance, inertia, and inaction are
not to endanger America’s constitutional form of government.
Which is precisely the situation here, inasmuch as the purported
“election” of Obama as President, notwithstanding his ineligibility
for that office, not only will render illegitimate the Executive
Branch of the General Government, but also will render impotent its
Legislative Branch (as explained below).
Second, the notion upon which the judge in Berg v. Obama
fastened—namely, that Berg’s “grievance remains too generalized to
establish the existence of an injury in fact,” i.e., if
everyone is injured or potentially injured then no one has
“standing”—is absurd on its face.
To be sure, no one has yet voted for Obama in the general election.
But does that mean that no one in any group smaller than the general
pool of America’s voters in its entirety has suffered specific harm
from Obama’s participation in the electoral process to date? Or will
suffer such harm from his continuing participation? What about the
Democrats who voted for Hillary Clinton as their party’s nominee,
but were saddled with Obama because other Democrats voted for him
even though they could not legally have done so if his lack of
eligibility for “the Office of President” had been judicially
determined before the Democratic primaries or convention? What about
the States that have registered Obama as a legitimate candidate for
President, but will have been deceived, perhaps even defrauded, if
he is proven not to be “a natural born Citizen”? And as far as the
general election is concerned, what about the voters among erstwhile
Republicans and Independents who do not want John McCain as
President, and therefore will vote for Obama (or any
Democrat, for that matter) as “the lesser of two evils,” but who
later on may have their votes effectively thrown out, and may have
to suffer McCain’s being declared the winner of the election, if
Obama’s ineligibility is established? Or what about those voters who
made monetary contributions to Obama’s campaign, but may at length
discover that their funds went, not only to an ineligible candidate,
but to one who knew he was ineligible?
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These obvious harms pale into insignificance, however, compared to
the national disaster of having an outright usurper
purportedly “elected” as “President.” In this situation, it is
downright idiocy to claim, as did the judge in Berg v. Obama,
that a “generalized” injury somehow constitutes no judicially
cognizable injury at all. Self-evidently, to claim that a
“generalized” grievance negates “the existence of an injury in fact”
is patently illogical—for if everyone in any group can complain of
the same harm of which any one of them can complain, then the
existence of some harm cannot be denied; and the more people who can
complain of that harm, the greater the aggregate or cumulative
seriousness of the injury. The whole may not be greater than the sum
of its parts; but it is at least equal to that sum! Moreover, for a
judge to rule that no injury redressable in a court of law exists,
precisely because everyone in America will be
subjected to an individual posing as “the President” but who
constitutionally cannot be (and therefore is not) the President,
sets America on the course of judicially assisted political suicide.
If Obama turns out to be nothing more than an usurper who has
fraudulently seized control of the Presidency, not only will the
Constitution have been egregiously flouted, but also this whole
country could be, likely will be, destroyed as a consequence. And if
this country is even credibly threatened with destruction, every
American will be harmed—irretrievably, should the threat become
actuality—including those who voted or intend to vote for Obama,
who are also part of We the People. Therefore, in this
situation, any and every American must have “standing” to
demand—and must demand, both in judicial fora and in the fora of
public opinion—that Obama immediately and conclusively
prove himself eligible for “the Office of President.”
Utterly imbecilic as an alternative is the judge’s prescription in
Berg v. Obama that,
[i]f,
through the political process, Congress determines that
citizens, voters, or party members should police the
Constitution’s eligibility requirements for the Presidency, then
it is free to pass laws conferring standing on individuals like
[Berg]. Until that time, voters do not have standing to bring
the sort of challenge that [Berg] attempts to bring * * * .
Recall that this selfsame judge held that Berg has no constitutional
“Case[ ]” because he has no “standing,” and that he has no
“standing” because he has no “injury in fact,” only a “generalized”
“grievance.” This purports to be a finding of constitutional law:
namely, that constitutionally no “Case[ ]” exists. How, then, can
Congress constitutionally grant “standing” to individuals
such as Berg, when the courts (assuming the Berg decision is upheld
on appeal) have ruled that those individuals have no “standing”? If
“standing” is a constitutional conception, and the courts deny that
“standing” exists in a situation such as this, and the courts have
the final say as to what the Constitution means—then Congress lacks
any power to contradict them. Congress cannot instruct the courts to
exercise jurisdiction beyond what the Constitution includes within
“the judicial Power.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
173-180 (1803).
In fact, though, a Congressional instruction is entirely
unnecessary. Every American has what lawyers call “an implied cause
of action”—directly under Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the
Constitution—to require that anyone standing for “the Office of
President” must verify his eligibility for that position, at least
when serious allegations have been put forward that he is not
eligible, and he has otherwise refused to refute those allegations
with evidence that should be readily available if he is eligible.
That “Case[ ]” is one the Constitution itself defines. And the
Constitution must be enforceable in such a “Case[ ]” in a timely
manner, by anyone who cares to seek enforcement, because of the
horrendous consequences that will ensue if it is flouted.
What are some of those consequences?
First, if Obama is not “a natural born Citizen” or has renounced
such citizenship, he is simply not eligible for “the Office
of President” (Article II, Section 1, Clause 4). That being so, he
cannot be “elected” by the voters, by the Electoral
College, or by the House of Representatives (see Amendment XII). For
neither the voters, nor the Electors, nor Members of the House can
change the constitutional requirement, even by unanimous vote
inter sese (see Article V). If, nonetheless, the voters, the
Electors, or the Members of the House purport to “elect” Obama, he
will be nothing but an usurper, because the Constitution
defines him as such. And he can never become anything else, because
an usurper cannot gain legitimacy if even all of the country aid,
abets, accedes to, or acquiesces in his usurpation.
Second, if Obama dares to take the Presidential “Oath or
Affirmation” of office, knowing that he is not “a natural born
Citizen,” he will commit the crime of perjury or false swearing (see
Article II, Section 1, Clause 7). For, being ineligible for “the
Office of President, he cannot “faithfully execute the Office of
President of the United States,” or even execute it at all, to any
degree. Thus, his very act of taking the “Oath or Affirmation” will
be a violation thereof! So, even if the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court himself looks the other way and administers the “Oath or
Affirmation,” Obama will derive no authority whatsoever from it.
Third, his purported “Oath or Affirmation” being perjured from the
beginning, Obama’s every subsequent act in the usurped “Office of
President” will be a criminal offense under Title 18, United States
Code, Section 242, which provides that:
[w]hoever,
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory,
Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States * * * shall be fined *
* * or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily
injury results from the acts committed in violation of this
section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall
be fined * * * or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both;
and if death results from the acts committed in violation of
this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to
kidnap, * * *, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined * * * or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be
sentenced to death.
Plainly enough, every supposedly “official” act performed by an
usurper in the President’s chair will be an act “under color of law”
that necessarily and unavoidably “subjects [some] person * * * to
the deprivation of [some] rights, privileges, or immunities secured
or protected by the Constitution * * * of the United States”—in the
most general case, of the constitutional “right[ ]” to an eligible
and duly elected individual serving as President, and the
corresponding constitutional “immunit[y]” from subjection to an
usurper pretending to be “the President.”
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Fourth, if he turns out to be nothing but an usurper acting in the
guise of “the President,” Obama will not constitutionally be the
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and
of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States” (see Article II, Section 2, Clause 1).
Therefore, he will be entitled to no obedience whatsoever from
anyone in those forces. Indeed, for officers or men to follow any of
his purported “orders” will constitute a serious breach of military
discipline—and in extreme circumstances perhaps even “war crimes.”
In addition, no one in any civilian agency in the Executive Branch
of the General Government will be required to put into effect any of
Obama’s purported “proclamations,” “executive orders,” or
“directives.”
Fifth, as nothing but an usurper (if he becomes one), Obama will
have no conceivable authority “to make Treaties”, or to “nominate,
and * * * appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not * * * otherwise provided for [in
the Constitution]” (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2). And therefore
any “Treaties” or “nominat[ions], and * * * appoint[ments]” he
purports to “make” will be void ab initio, no matter what
the Senate does, because the Senate can neither authorize an usurper
to take such actions in the first place, nor thereafter ratify them.
One need not be a lawyer to foresee what further, perhaps
irremediable, chaos must ensue if an usurper, even with “the Advice
and Consent of the Senate”, unconstitutionally “appoint[s] * * *
Judges of the Supreme Court” whose votes thereafter make up the
majorities that wrongly decide critical “Cases” of constitutional
law.
Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, Congress can pass no law while
an usurper pretends to occupy “the Office of President.” The
Constitution provides that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a
Law, be presented to the President of the United States” (Article I,
Section 7, Clause 2). Not to an usurper posturing as “the President
of the United States,” but to the true and rightful President. If no
such true and rightful President occupies the White House, no “Bill”
will or can, “before it become a Law, be presented to [him].” If no
“Bill” is so presented, no “Bill” will or can become a “Law.” And
any purported “Law” that the usurper “approve[s]” and “sign[s],” or
that Congress passes over the usurper’s “Objections,” will be a
nullity. Thus, if Obama deceitfully “enters office” as an usurper,
Congress will be rendered effectively impotent for as long as it
acquiesces in his pretenses as “President.”
Seventh, if Obama does become an usurper posturing as “the
President,” Congress cannot even impeach him because, not being the
actual President, he cannot be “removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” (see Article II, Section 4). In that case, some other
public officials would have to arrest him—with physical force, if he
would not go along quietly—in order to prevent him from continuing
his imposture. Obviously, this could possibly lead to armed
conflicts within the General Government itself, or among the States
and the people.
Eighth, even did something approaching civil war not eventuate from
Obama’s hypothetical usurpation, if the Establishment allowed Obama
to pretend to be “the President,” and the people acquiesced in that
charade, just about everything that was done during his faux
“tenure in office” by anyone connected with the Executive Branch of
the General Government, and quite a bit done by the Legislative
Branch and perhaps the Judicial Branch as well, would be arguably
illegitimate and subject to being overturned when a constitutional
President was finally installed in office. The potential for chaos,
both domestically and internationally, arising out of this systemic
uncertainty is breathtaking.
The underlying problem will not be obviated if Obama, his partisans
in the Democratic Party, and his cheerleaders and cover-up artists
in the big media simply stonewall the issue of his (non)citizenship
and contrive for him to win the Presidential election. The cat is
already out of the bag and running all over the Internet. If he
continues to dodge the issue, Obama will be dogged with this
question every day of his purported “Presidency.” And inevitably
the truth will out. For the issue is too simple, the evidence
(or lack of it) too accessible. Either Obama can prove that he is “a
natural born Citizen” who has not renounced his citizenship; or he
cannot. And he will not be allowed to slip through with some
doctored “birth certificate” generated long after the alleged fact.
On a matter this important, Americans will demand that,
before its authenticity is accepted, any supposed documentary
evidence of that sort be subjected to reproducible forensic analyses
conducted by reputable, independent investigators and laboratories
above any suspicion of being influenced by or colluding with any
public official, bureaucracy, political party, or other
special-interest organization whatsoever.
Berg v. Obama may very well end up in the Supreme Court.
Yet that ought to be unnecessary. For Obama’s moral duty is to
produce the evidence of his citizenship sua sponte et instanter.
Otherwise, he will be personally responsible for all the
consequences of his refusal to do so.
Of course, if Obama knows that he is not “a natural born Citizen”
who never renounced his American citizenship, then he also knows
that he and his henchmen have perpetrated numerous election-related
frauds throughout the country—the latest, still-ongoing one a
colossal swindle targeting the American people as a whole. If that
is the case, his refusal “to be a witness against himself” is
perfectly explicable and even defensible on the grounds of the Fifth
Amendment. Howsoever justified as a matter of criminal law, though,
Obama’s silence and inaction will not obviate the necessity for him
to prove his eligibility for “the Office of President.” The
Constitution may permit him to “take the Fifth;” but it will not
suffer him to employ that evasion as a means to usurp the Presidency
of the United States.
Edwin Vieira, Jr., holds four degrees from
Harvard: A.B. (Harvard College), A.M. and Ph.D. (Harvard Graduate School
of Arts and Sciences), and J.D. (Harvard Law School).
For more than thirty years he
has practiced law, with emphasis on constitutional issues. In the
Supreme Court of the United States he successfully argued or briefed the
cases leading to the landmark decisions Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, and Communications Workers
of America v. Beck, which established constitutional and statutory
limitations on the uses to which labor unions, in both the private and
the public sectors, may apply fees extracted from nonunion workers as a
condition of their employment.
He has written numerous
monographs and articles in scholarly journals, and lectured throughout
the county. His most recent work on money and banking is the two-volume
Pieces of Eight: The Monetary
Powers and Disabilities of the United States Constitution (2002), the
most comprehensive study in existence of American monetary law and
history viewed from a constitutional perspective.
www.piecesofeight.us
He is also the co-author (under
a nom de plume) of the political novel
CRA$HMAKER: A Federal Affaire
(2000), a not-so-fictional story of an engineered crash of the Federal
Reserve System, and the political upheaval it causes.
www.crashmaker.com